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Abstract 
Christian List has recently constructed a novel formal framework for representing the 
relationship between free will and determinism. At its core is a distinction between 
physical and agential levels of description. List has argued that, since the consequence 
argument cannot be reconstructed within this framework, the consequence argument 
rests on a ‘category mistake’: an illicit conflation of the physical and agential levels. I 
show that an expanded version of List’s framework allows the construction of a cross-
level consequence argument.  
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Christian List (2014, 2019a, b) has constructed a novel formal framework for 
representing the relationship between free will and determinism. The key innovation 
of the framework is that the physical and agential levels of description are explicitly 
represented, with each level having its own modal operators. List uses this framework 
to argue for a ‘libertarian compatibilist’ view on which the agential possibility of 
doing otherwise is compatible with determinism at the physical level. This is a 
version of compatibilism, in so far as it defends the compatibility of free will and 
physical determinism, but it also agrees with the libertarian that an agent ‘could have 
done otherwise’, provided ‘could’ is understood as a claim about agential, not 
physical, possibility. 
 
This article constructs, within a slightly expanded version of List’s 
framework, a valid cross-level variant of van Inwagen’s (1983) consequence 
argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. In very informal terms, 
the consequence argument states that since we cannot change the laws of nature or the 
initial conditions of the universe, and since, given determinism, our actions now are 
logical consequences of these facts, we do not have free will if determinism is true. 
To avoid lengthy exposition, I will assume familiarity with van Inwagen’s 
formalization of the consequence argument in terms of “Rule Beta” (i.e. the third 
formulation given in van Inwagen 1983, Chapter 3). List (2019a) has claimed that this 
argument cannot be reconstructed within his framework, because it would involve a 
“category mistake”. The aim of this article is to show that such a reconstruction is 
possible and need involve no such mistake.  
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This cross-level consequence argument is of philosophical interest in its own 
right, since it has two important advantages over previous formulations: it explicitly 
incorporates the physical and agential levels of description, and it spells out the 
meaning of the relevant agent-level modal operator in a precise way. van Inwagen’s 
formulation of the consequence argument notoriously relies on an informally 
characterized modal operator, N, that admits of multiple conflicting interpretations, 
spawning a large literature in which N is understood in various ways (e.g. Carlson 
2000; Blum 2000; Huemer 2000; Beebee 2002; Campbell 2007; Huemer 2008; Pruss 
2013; Gustafsson 2017). List’s framework allows us to avoid van Inwagen’s N and to 
formulate the argument using more precisely defined modal operators. 
 
1. List’s framework 
List’s (2014, 2019a) approach is based on models of dynamical systems with laws 
that are deterministic at the physical level and indeterministic at the agential level (see 
also List and Pivato 2015). This section explains the basic formal framework. I will 
follow the exposition of List (2019a), with one important difference, as explained 
below. 
 
Let S denote the set of all possible physical states of the system, which are 
each fully specified and mutually exclusive. Let T denote the set of all points in time, 
where T is linearly ordered. A physical history is a function, denoted h, from T into S, 
which assigns to each point in time the corresponding state. Let Ω denote the set of all 
logically possible physical histories. Physical-level propositions are (extensionally) 
subsets of Ω, though we normally use sentences in a language to pick them out. A 
proposition p is true at some history h if and only if h is contained in the relevant 
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subset of Ω.  
 
To introduce physical-level modal operators, we define an accessibility 
relation between the elements of Ω. Whether one physical history is accessible from 
another depends on the time in question. We can posit, following List (2014, p. 164; 
2019a, p. 261), that history h is physically accessible from history h' at time t if and 
only if the two histories have the same initial segment up to time t and diverge, at 
most, thereafter. A physical-level proposition p is physically necessary in history h at 
time t if and only if p is true in all histories h' physically accessible from h at t. 
Similarly, p is physically possible in history h at time t if and only if p is true in some 
history h' physically accessible from h at t.  
 
To introduce agent-level propositions and modal operators, we need to re-
describe the system. Let denote the set of all logically possible states as described at 
the agential level. Each state in  specifies the mental attitudes and actions of all 
agents in the system at the time in question. We assume that the agential states in  
supervene on the physical states in S, meaning that there exists a function σ from S 
into  in which multiple physical states may be mapped on to the same agential state. 
Like physical states, different agential states are mutually exclusive.  
 
An agential history is a temporal path of the system through its agent-level 
state space. Formally, this is a function  from T into . Each physical history h gives 
rise to a corresponding agential history , obtained by applying the supervenience 
mapping σ to the given physical history. Formally, we write  = σ(h). Let  denote 
the set of all logically possible agential histories. An agential-level proposition, then, 
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is (extensionally) a subset of . 
 
Let us now define necessity and possibility at the agential level. This is where 
I must take issue with List’s exposition. List defines agential accessibility as follows: 
an agential history  is agentially accessible from another such history ' at time t if 
and only if the two histories have the same initial segment up to time t and diverge, at 
most, thereafter (List 2014, p. 165; List 2019a, p. 262). However, it begs the question 
against an incompatibilist opponent to assume, as a matter of definition, that only the 
agential past at t, and not the physical past, constrains agential accessibility. Since my 
aim in this paper is to construct an argument against compatibilism, I want to avoid 
any such presupposition. Accordingly, I will take the agential accessibility of one 
agential history from another at t as a primitive relation.  
 
We can now define agential necessity and possibility with reference to 
agential accessibility. A purely agent-level proposition  is agentially necessary in 
agential history  at time t if and only if  is true in all agential histories ' agentially 
accessible from  at t. Similarly,  is agentially possible in agential history  at time t 
if and only if  is true in some history ' agentially accessible from  at t.  
 
In List’s framework, the physical level past, plus a set of deterministic 
physical laws, determine the physical-level future. Meanwhile, the agent-level past, 
plus a set of deterministic laws of agency (laws relating the agential facts at one time 
to the agential facts a moment later), would determine the agent-level future—if there 
were any such laws. In reality, however, the laws of the agent-level are 
indeterministic: the agent-level facts at a given time leave various futures open. In 
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light of this, and given List’s definition of agential accessibility, alternative 
possibilities are agentially possible at any time. This is not threatened by physical-
level determinism, as long as the various physical histories that are compatible with 
the agential past up to that time lead to a range different agential futures. 
 
List sees this as an argument for compatibilism. However, since his definition 
of agential accessibility presupposes compatibilism, it can’t be used in a non-
question-begging argument for it. It is more accurate to say the framework provides a 
formal representation of compatibilism. By contrast, if we take agential accessibility 
as a primitive relation (as urged above), the framework leaves open the question of 
whether the physical-level past plus a deterministic set of physical laws are 
compatible with the agential possibility of alternative actions. This gives us a 
framework within which an argument against compatibilism can be constructed. 
 
2. An expansion of the framework 
List (2019a, pp. 266-268) argues that there is no way to formulate a compelling 
version of the consequence argument within his framework. We can, he argues, 
formulate a version of the argument using only the physical-level modal operators, 
but this says nothing about the agent level. We can also formulate a version using 
only the agent-level modal operators, but, since agent-level determinism is clearly 
false (i.e., actions are not determined by past actions plus laws of agency), this 
version is clearly unsound. What List argues we cannot do is move, as van Inwagen 
does, between claims about the physical level and claims about the agent level. To do 
this, List argues, is to make a ‘category mistake’. List therefore concludes that his 
version of compatibilism evades van Inwagen’s challenge.  
 
 
8 
 
However, it is possible to formulate, within a slightly expanded version of 
List’s formalism, a ‘cross-level’ version of the consequence argument that specifically 
targets his version of compatibilism. To formulate such an argument, we first need a 
way of expressing claims about the relations between the physical and agential levels. 
We can do this by expanding List’s framework in a straightforward way. 
 
Consider the Cartesian product Ω× , a set comprising all logically possible 
pairs of physical and agential histories. It will be convenient to refer to these pairs of 
histories simply as “worlds” from now on. If it is logically possible that the 
supervenience mapping σ fails to obtain, Ω×  will contain worlds that violate this 
mapping. Moreover, if the supervenience mapping is metaphysically but not logically 
necessary, Ω×  will contain some metaphysically impossible worlds. It will be 
useful, given this, to have a way of denoting the subset of Ω×  comprising all and 
only those worlds (h, ) such that  = σ(h). This is the set of all logically possible 
worlds compatible with the supervenience mapping σ(h). Call this subset Ψ. Ψ is the 
proposition that the agential level supervenes on the physical level in accordance with 
the supervenience mapping σ(h).  
 
 List can have no objection to this expansion of the framework, because such 
an expansion is needed in order to assert Ψ, i.e. to assert the proposition that the 
agent-level supervenes on the physical-level in accordance with σ(h). If List refused 
to allow this expansion, but continued to maintain that cross-level propositions which 
cannot be expressed within the framework are category mistakes, he would be forced 
to conclude that any assertion of the supervenience of one level on another is also a 
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category mistake. But the existence of such supervenience relations is a foundational 
assumption of List’s approach. 
 
Physical-level propositions and agent-level propositions that are actually true 
will both map to subsets of Ψ. Moreover, there will be subsets of Ψ that are most 
naturally picked out by sentences that mix physical and agential language, such as the 
sentence that there is an agent in some region only if there is physical matter in that 
region, or the sentence that a certain action requires a certain amount of energy to 
perform.  
 
3. Cross-level bridging principles 
We are now in a position to say more about the relation between the agential and 
physical levels. In particular, we can introduce a bridging principle:  
 
Bridging Principle 1: A world (h´, ´) is agentially accessible from another 
world (h, ) at t if and only if ´ is agentially accessible from at t and h´ is 
physically accessible from h at t. 
 
From this agential accessibility relation between worlds, we can derive an expanded 
notion of agential possibility at a world, where p denotes any proposition within Ω× , 
including physical, agential, and mixed-level propositions: 
 
Bridging Principle 2: A proposition p is agentially possible in (h, ) at t if and 
only if there is a world (h´, ´) at which p is true that is agentially accessible 
from (h, ) at t. 
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Informally, these bridging principles expand the notions of agential accessibility and 
agential possibility, introducing a sense in which propositions that are not themselves 
purely agent-level can be agentially possible at a world. If we endorse the bridging 
principles then we can talk meaningfully of the agential possibility of any proposition, 
regardless of whether it is an agent-level proposition, a physical-level proposition, or 
a mixed-level proposition.  
 
It might be objected that the bridging principles beg the question against a 
compatibilist by tying agential possibility to physical possibility, so that a proposition 
that is physically impossible at t cannot be agentially possible at t. However, I see the 
dialectical situation like this: true enough, one way to be a compatibilist is to deny the 
above bridging principles. But many compatibilists, I take it, will not want to resort to 
denying the bridging principles, because they accept that physically impossible 
propositions are not agentially possible. Rather, they will want to show that the 
bridging principles pose no threat to compatibilism. For these compatibilists, the 
question arises: can one consistently accept the bridging principles and still be a 
compatibilist? This is the question that is at issue in the following discussion. 
 
I suspect List would regard this expansion of the framework as a “dramatic 
redefinition of the semantics of the agential-level modal operators” (List 2019a, p. 
271). Of such redefinitions, he comments that “the agential ‘can’ is a higher-level 
notion; it is not to be found at the fine-grained level at which any such redefinition 
would attempt to relocate it” (p. 271). The concern appears to be that, by constructing 
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an expanded agential possibility operator that may take physical-level propositions as 
inputs, we are severing it from the ordinary meaning of the word “can”.  
 
I have two responses to this. First, note that many ordinary statements apply 
“can” to physical-level events without loss of meaning. For example, I might say “I 
can try to stop a virus spreading, but I cannot stop a virus mutating”. On the face of it, 
this is a true statement, not a category mistake, even though the mutation of a virus is 
a physical-level event. Second, I reject the underlying assumption that our intuitions 
about ordinary language should constrain the construction of formal frameworks for 
debating free will. Better, I suggest, to see where the bridging principles lead, while 
allowing that one possible compatibilist escape route is simply to deny that the 
bridging principles capture a legitimate sense of agential possibility. 
 
4. Cross-level modal operators 
Now let us define an operator such that  p is true if and only if p (which may be 
an agent-level proposition, a physical-level proposition, or a cross-level proposition) 
is true at all worlds (h, ) ∈ Ω×  and at all times t. Thus defined, the  operator is 
implied by and close to logical necessity, although some propositions may be true at 
all logically possible pairs of physical and agential histories without being strictly 
logically necessary (e.g. the proposition that there is an agential level). It implies but 
is not implied by metaphysical necessity, because Ω× may contain worlds at which 
metaphysically necessary truths are violated. As noted above, this will be the case if 
the supervenience of the agential level on the physical level is metaphysically but not 
logically necessary. Similarly, it implies but is not implied by nomological necessity, 
because Ω× contains worlds at which the actual laws of nature are violated. The  
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operator allows us to express the idea that the initial state of the universe, the laws of 
physics, and the supervenience mapping between levels determine the agent-level 
facts. 
 
We now need to introduce a variant of van Inwagen’s N, defined in terms of 
List’s formalism. Let us call this N: 
 
Np in world (h, ) at time t if and only if (by definition) not-p is not agentially 
possible in (h, ) at t. 
 
If we grant that there is no category mistake involved in the expanded notion 
of agential possibility introduced above, then there is also no category mistake 
involved in formulating N. A difference with van Inwagen’s N is that our N only 
yields an output if a world (h, ) and a time point t are both specified. If no world or 
no time point is specified, the agential possibility operator yields no output. Np 
informally means that there is no agentially possible future at (h, ) and t in which p is 
false. 
 
5. A cross-level consequence argument 
With these pieces in place, we can now reconstruct the consequence argument. We 
need the following two inference rules: 
  
Rule Alpha: If  p, infer: Np at all (h, ), t  
Rule Beta: If Np and N(p→q) at (h, ), t, infer: Nq at (h, ), t. 
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These rules are supported by our expanded definition of agential possibility and by 
our bridging principles. Rule Alpha is valid because, if p is true at all worlds, then, 
trivially, there can be no world at which p is false that is agentially accessible from (h, 
) at t. Rule Beta is valid because, if p is true at all worlds accessible from (h, ) at t, 
and if (p→q) is also true at all these worlds, then none of these are worlds at which q 
is false. 
 
We also need the following notation: p0 is a physical proposition uniquely 
specifying the initial physical state of the focal agent’s universe; is an agent-level 
proposition uniquely specifying the agential state of the focal agent at some later time 
t1 (e.g. I raised my right-hand at t); l is a proposition specifying the laws of the 
physical level in the focal agent’s universe; and Ψ (as introduced above) is the 
proposition that a specific supervenience mapping σ(h) from physical histories to 
agential histories obtains. 
 
Note that, assuming determinism, the conjunction of the initial physical state 
of the universe and the laws, p0 & l, can be identified with a unique physical-level 
history h1 at which both conjuncts are true. Note further that this physical-level 
history maps, by the supervenience mapping σ(h), to a unique agent-level history, , 
which in turn determines , the state of the focal agent at t1. Thus, assuming 
determinism and the supervenience of the agential on the physical, the conjunction p0 
& l & Ψ logically entails , and thus  ((p0 & l & Ψ) → ) is true. 
 
We can use this observation to run a cross-level consequence argument from 
determinism and supervenience to the impossibility of doing otherwise, as follows. 
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Cross-level consequence argument:  
1.  ((p0 & l & Ψ) → )  (Determinism plus supervenience) 
2.  (p0 →( l →(Ψ → )))  (Rearrangement of 1) 
3. N (p0 →( l →(Ψ → ))) at (h1, ), t1 (from Rule Alpha) 
4. N p0 at (h1, ), t1 (Fixed Past) 
5. N (l →(Ψ → )) at (h1, ), t1 (from Rule Beta) 
6. N l at (h1, ), t1 (Fixed Laws) 
7. N (Ψ → ) at (h1, ), t1 (from Rule Beta) 
8. N Ψ at (h1, ), t1 (Fixed Mapping) 
9. N at (h1, ), t1 (from Rule Beta) 
 
This is a variant of van Inwagen’s consequence argument. It differs from van 
Inwagen’s original formulation in two respects. First, rather than relying on an 
informally characterized modal operator N, the work is done by the operator N which 
is defined in terms of an agential accessibility relation. Second, rather than implicitly 
assuming the metaphysical determination of agent-level facts by physical-level facts, 
the above formulation explicitly incorporates this determination via the inclusion of 
the proposition Ψ that the supervenience mapping σ(h) obtains, along with an extra 
premise, Fixed Mapping, asserting that histories where the supervenience mapping 
fails to obtain are not agentially possible.  
 
 The argument as a whole proceeds from determinism and supervenience to 
the agential impossibility of doing otherwise, presenting an obstacle to List’s 
‘libertarian compatibilism’. It poses a greater threat than either of the single-level 
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consequence arguments considered by List (2019a, pp. 266-268). Unlike List’s purely 
physical-level version, it establishes the agential necessity of an agent-level 
proposition. And unlike List’s purely agent-level version, it does not rely on the 
(implausible) assumption that the agent-level past and the agent-level laws determine 
the agent-level present. 
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